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NOISE TRADING IN SMALL MARKETS
Frederic PALOMINO* 




Noise traders have often been defined as those who falsely be­
lieve th a t they have private information about the future price of 
risky assets. Using such a definition, it was dem onstrated tha t, 
in perfectly competitive markets, when trading against rational 
investors, noise traders are always expected to disappear in the 
long run if the im itation rule chosen is based on relative utility 
levels. In this article, we focus on the survival of noise traders 
in imperfectly competitive markets. Under such an assumption, 
we dem onstrate th a t there exist im itation rules based on relative 
utility levels such th a t noise traders dominate the market in the 
long run.
*1 would like to thank Alan Kirman and Robert Waldmann for helpful comments. 





















































































































































































1 In trod u ction
Two ways to model noise trading have been either by way of an exoge- 
neous, inelastic demand for an asset as in Kyle (1984, 1985, 1989) or in 
a competitive fashion as in De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann1 
(1989, 1990, 1991). In this last series of articles, noise traders ’’are those 
who falsely believe that they have special information about the future 
price of risky assets” . Noise trading results from maximizing behaviour 
and thus is not infinitely inelastic with respect to prices. However only 
a perfectly competitive economy is studied. In a model in which traders 
have an infinite horizon, noise traders may survive in the long run, in the 
sense that their wealth share in the economy never goes to zero. This 
happens when their utility is ’’closer” to the log utility than is the util­
ity of rational investors. Thus, noise traders have a higher expected rate 
of change of log wealth. Blume and Easley (1989) have generalized this 
result by demonstrating that
’’traders whose expected growth rate of wealth share is posi­
tive, no matter how small, will come to dominate the market 
over other traders pursuing strategies that perhaps offer higher 
expected returns (measured in either wealth or utility)” .
In overlapping generation models, when traders have exponential utility 
functions and uncertainty is normally distributed, it is established that, 
in the presence of fundamental risk, noise traders can survive in the long 
run if the imitation rule chosen is based on realized returns (i.e. noise 
traders can have higher returns than rational investors). If the imitation 
rule chosen is based on realized utility levels, noise traders are always 
expected to disappear in the long run. The reason is that if noise traders 
are on average bullish, they buy larger quantities of risky asset than 
rational investors do and thus bear more risk. Noise traders reach a 
lower utility level because the difference in risk beared offsets the higher 
return. This analysis should be extended in two directions. First, as in 





























































































than noise traders but that they spend time analyzing financial reports 
and processing pieces of information about the asset traded and thus pay 
a cost for their better knowledge of the market. Therefore, if this cost, 
which is certain, is larger than the difference in expected utility, noise 
traders will be expected to survive in the long run. The second extension 
deals with market size and the intensity of competition between noise 
traders and rational traders. Speaking about firms, Enke (1951) explains 
that
”If there is no competition, a great many policies-all”good” but 
only one ’’best”- will permit an isolated monopoly to survive, 
the fact that such a firm exists is not a reason for supposing 
that it is securing maximum profits. However, if there is intense 
competition, all policies save the ’’best” may result in negative 
profits and in time elimination; then firms that survive must, 
through some combination of good luck or good management, 
have happened upon optimal policies.”
Our article concentrates on that second issue. We consider an econ­
omy in which a finite number of agents trade and behave as imperfect 
competitors. One can argue that financial markets are usually seen as 
the best example for a perfectly competitive market. However, as Lakon- 
ishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) have demonstrated, in small markets, 
i.e stocks with small market capitalization, institutional investors influ­
ence prices. At the scale of the NYSE, it may be of no interest to study 
small markets, but at the scale of the average size on a European stock 
exchange, it may become an important issue. Our main result is that, in 
small markets, noise traders may, on average, dominate the market even 
with an imitation rule based on utility levels. This result can be easily 
explained. With imperfect competition, irrational behavior can impose 
higher costs on rational competitors than on the irrational agent himself 
[See Schaffer (1989)]. In DSSW’s model, imperfect competition increases 
the difference in returns between noise traders and rational investors and 
reduces more than proportionately the difference in risk bearing. As noise 
traders on average dominate the market, it is then of interest to study 




























































































economy. Two issues studied separately in DSSW (1989) and in Pagano 
(1990) are now mixed. We derive the result that any tax based gov­
ernment policy is Pareto inferior to open market operations aimed out 
counteracting the effect of noise traders.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the model will 
be presented. In section 3, it will be established that there exists an imi­
tation rule based on utility levels,such that noise traders are expected to 
survive in the long run. In section 4, the impact of noise traders on the 
economy will be studied.
2 T h e m od el
2.1 P resen ta tio n  o f th e  m odel
We consider a model similar to DSSW (1990), i.e an overlapping gener­
ation model with two-period-lived agents where the only decision agents 
make is to choose a portfolio when young. The economy contains two 
assets. The first asset s is a risk free bond available in infinitely inelastic 
supply, so its price is always fixed to one. s pays a fixed coupon r. The 
second asset u is a risky stock, u pays a random dividend 8t independent 
and identically normally distributed with mean 8* > r and variance of. 
The stock supply is a fixed and unchangeable quantity: Z units. The 
price of u in period t is denoted pt- There are two types of agents: sophis­
ticated investors (denoted s) who have rational expectations and noise 
traders (denoted n ). We assume that N sophisticated investors and M 
noise traders are present in the model and that all agents of a given type 
are identical. Both types of agents choose their portfolio when young 
to maximize perceived expected utility given their own beliefs about the 
ex-ante distribution of <5(+1 and pt+\- Both noise traders and sophisti­
cated investors young in period t accurately perceive the distribution of 
pt+i 2. The representative sophisticated investor accurately perceives the 
distribution of 8t+\. The representative noise trader misperceives the ex­
2In DSSW (1990), noise traders accurately perceive the distribution of the dividend 




























































































pected dividend (<§*) by an independent random variable pt identically 
normally distributed with mean p* and variance a2. Each agent’s utility 
is a constant absolute risk aversion function of wealth when old:
U = - e - ^ ”> (1)
where 7 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. At time t (t = 
1 , . . . ,  00), each sophisticated trader j  (j = 1 ,. . .  ,N )  chooses a demand 
schedule X jtt(.) and each noise trader m (m — 1 chooses a de­
mand schedule Ymit(.). Given a market clearing price pt, the quantities 
traded by sophisticated and noise traders can be written
•Cj,t — X j}t {pt), j  — 1 ? • • • i A", Vm.t — ^m.t (Pt) i ^  — 11 • • • i M . (2)
2.2 E x isten ce  o f a N ash  equilibrium  in dem and sched­
ules
Since utility function maximization is equivalent to a quadratic function 
maximization, we know from Kyle (1989), that if all agents conjecture 
linear residual supply curve (i.e. for all j  = 1 , . . . ,  N, pt = -I- A
and for all m = 1, . . . ,  M, pt =  pn,t + ̂ n,tym,t ) then there exists a symmet­
ric linear Nash equilibrium in demand schedules that is also a Rational 
Expectation Equilibrium. Let i?t+1 =  <ft+1 -f pt+\ . Demand schedules are 
such that:
If 2ASiH- yVart(Rt+l) > 0
x  ( ) = Es,t{Rt+i) ~Pt{l + r) 
h A.,f(l + r ) + 7Kar(Rm )
If 2ASii + yV art(Rt+i) =  0, then
Y / \ _  2[pt(l +  r) -  ESti(Rt+i)] 
3 , 1  lV a r t(Rt+1)
If 2An ( +  yVart(Rf+i) > 0
Y / \ _  En,t(Rt+1) — Pt(l +  r)































































































If 2A„jt + 7Vart(Rt+i) =  0, then
=  (6)
jV a r t(Rt+i)
where Es<t and En l respectively denote the expectation operator at time 
t of sophisticated investors and noise traders.
Proposition 1: Assume I  > 2. There exists a symmetric linear 
Nash equilibrium in demand schedule such that (for all j  =  1 , . . . ,  N  and 
for all m = 1__ , M)
( 1 - 2 )  [Es,t(Rt+i ) - p t(l + r)} 
( I -  1) 7 Vart(Rt+1)
(7)
( 1 - 2 )  (En,t(Rt+1) -  P,( 1 + r)]  
(I -  1) jV a r t(R,+1) (8)
Remark: This equilibrium may not be unique. However it is the 
only one such that both sophisticated investors and noise traders consider 
the risky asset as a normal good. Furthermore, as the only random vari­
able in /is j  is pt, it follows that rational investors have a perfect knowledge 
of noise traders’ beliefs when they compute their demand schedule.
Proof: Assume that for all j  =  1 , N  and for all m =  1.......M.
2ASi< +  7V ar((i?(+i) > 0 2An ( +  7V art(Rt+i) > 0 (9)
Then, for all j  = 1 , . . . ,  N
Z ( N -  1) Es,t(Rt+1) — Pt(l +  r) 
,AS,<(1 + r) +  7V ar(Rt+i)_
+ M En,t{Rt+1) — Pi(l +  r)






























































































and, for all m — 1 , . . . ,  M
Z  =  N Es,t(Rt+i) — pt{ 1 +  ■
+ ( M -  1)
A,<(1 + r) + yVar(Rt+1) . 
En,t{Rt+ i) — P<(1 +  r + Ynm,t
A ,«(l +  r) + yVar(Rt+i)
So, have to solve the following system of equation:
[(l +  r )As,(] — (JV- 1)
+
[ ( l + r )An,<] 1 —
(1 + r ) \Stt + yVart(Rt+1) 
M
(1 +r)A„t< + yV art(Rt+1) 
N
(1 +  r )Xst +  yV  art{Rt+i) 
(M  -  1)
(1 +  r)An ( +  yX art(Rt+i)
Equations (12) and (13) imply that
1 1
+
(1 +  r ) \nt (1 +  r)Xnt +  yVart(Rt+i)
+(1 +  r ) \Sit (1 + r ) \ s<t + yVart(R<+i )
It follows that
A of — A„
Putting (15) in (12) yields
As,( — An)t — yVart(Rt+i) 








We can see that the demands of imperfect competition are de­
mands of perfect competition weighted by a coefficient of market size. 
The smaller the market the larger the difference between the demands of 




























































































2.3 T h e pricing fu nction
From the demand functions, we can compute the equilibrium price:
Pt = (1 + r )
N M
- j E s t{Rt+1) +  — Entt(Rt+i)
Z ( I -  1) yVart(Rt+l)
7 ( 7 - 2 )  (1 +  r)
We can see that pt+1 is independent of 6t+1, therefore




Pt = (1+r)  
Z ( I - l )
<5*
7 ( 7 - 2 )
frac^a]
+  Et(pt+1) +  — pt 
+  Far<(pt+1)](l + r )
(19)
As DSSW(1990), we consider only steady state equilibria by requiring 
that the unconditional distribution of pi+1 is equal to the unconditional 








Z ( I -  1)  7
7 ( 7 - 2 )  r
[<t26 + Vart(pt+1)]
( 20 )
Var(pt+i) = Vart (pt+i )
<r2p M 2
(1 + r )2 l 2
( 21)
Surprisingly, market volatility does not shrink when the degree of compet­
itiveness increases (i.e. when I increases). However equation (21) high­
lights another effect: variance generated by noise trading. As Pagano 
(1989) explains
In the real world, even in very deep markets, stock price can 
be very volatile. This is because in actual markets the vari­



























































































of new information that at any given moment leads investors 
to revise their expectation of future dividends and the trans­
action related noise deriving from the sample variance of in- 
vestors’demand.
However, although stock price volatility is independent of the degree of 
competitiveness, looking at equation (20) we can see that the market pays 
a premium for the lack of competitiveness and this premium decreases 
when market size increases.





(T+7 ) T ipi
z ( i -  1)7
I  ( 1 - 2 )  r <  +
1 M  ,
+  r T P
<7? 1M 2
J Z  (1 + r )2
( 22)
Market liquidity does not refer only to market size but instead refers 
to several properties. Kyle (1985), following Black (1971), reviewed the 
properties of a liquid market:
’’Market liquidity” is a slippery and elusive concept, in part 
because it encompasses a number of transactional properties of 
markets. These include ’’tightness” (the cost of turning around 
a position over a short period of time), ’’depth” (the size of an 
order flow innovation required to change price a given amount), 
and ’’resiliency” (the speed with which prices recover from a 
random, uninformative shock).
Thus the price function tells us that the stock market we consider is very 
resilient since for all t, pt+1 is independent of pt, and that the lower the 
share of noise traders in the economy, the deeper the market. As the 
’’tightness” property is irrelevant in this model, we can say that market 





























































































2.4 R e la tiv e  u tility  o f noise traders and sop h isti­
cated  investors
From the quantities traded and the equilibrium price, we can compute 
the difference of return between the two categories of agents.
ARE Tn^ t =  (Yt -  Xt)fe+i + Pt+i -  (1 + r)pt] (23)
From (8), it follows that
Yt - X t ( I - 2) Pt (24)






-  2) M





E (ARETn. a) = Z p> (I-- 2  ) M +  / 2)
I P (I--1 )  /  7 [ff« + Mi 1 P (l+r)2J
Imperfect competition increases the expected difference of returns be­
tween noise traders and sophisticated investors. The reason is that strate­
gic behaviour reduces rational investors incentives to bet against noise 
traders. Therefore, the difference of utility levels is:
AUn_s = ARE Tn_a -  1  ( I f  -  X?) Var(Rt+i)
Thus
(27)
Et(AU„-,) = Et[ARETn- s\ -  |  (Yt2 -  X?) Var(Rt+1) (28)
given that Yt2 — A',2 =  (Yt -  X t)(Yt + X t), and using equation (24), It 
follows that
Et(AUn- a) Z  pt
1 ( 1 - 1 )
(1 - 2)






























































































E(AUn- s) Z  P* 
1 ( 1 -  1)
(1-2)
( i -  i ) 2 7 ( r r 2  1 M 2  1  ̂ P ( 1 + r ) 2 J
(Pt2 +  ° l ) (30)
Difference of expected utility is increased for two reasons when compared 
to perfect competition. First, as we have seen above, because the differ­
ence of expected returns is increased. Second, because imperfect compe­
tition decreases quantities traded and so decreases the difference of risk 
borne by noise traders and by sophisticated investors3. But the main 
point is that in imperfect competition, for some sets of parameters, noise 
traders, if they are on average bullish, may expect to reach higher utility 
levels than sophisticated investors do4. This was not the case in a per­
fectly competitive economy since the first term in (30) is equal to zero. 
This term captures the market power of traders.
3 Im ita tio n  o f beliefs
As we consider a model with an integer number of traders, we cannot 
apply the imitation rule used in DSSW (1990). The one chosen is in the 
spirit of Kirman (1993).
Mt-i  e {1, 1} 
M(_! = 0
I f  > 0 Mt+1 = Mt + 1 (31)
I f  AUn- ait-i < o Mt+1= M t -  1 (32)
I f M t — 0 Prob(Mt+1 =  1) =  a
Prob(Mt+i =  0) =  1 — a
I f  Mt = 1 
Aft_! =  I  I f  Mt = I
Mt-)-i =  1
Prob(Mt+i — I  — 1) =  a 
Prob(Mt+i =  I) = 1 — a
3 It should be noted that an increase of fundamental risk has the same impact since 
it decreases quantities traded.
4Consider E(AUn- s) as a polynomial of p*. It has either zero or two positive real 
roots. For sets of parameters such that the second case occurs, let the roots be p\ and 




























































































I f  M t — I  -  \ Mt+i = 1 —1
where (AUn- Stt- \ ) is the difference in relative utility levels between 
traders young in period t. It means that Mt+1 is determined before pt+\ 
is observed. The specific cases Mt~i = 0 and Mt-\ = I  are necessary 
conditions to avoid the process to get stuck at 0 or I. However the larger 
7, the smaller a can be chosen5. The case Mt~\ =  0 and Mt = 1 (M<_i 
/ and Mt — I  — 1) mean that if imitation is impossible because only 
sophisticated investors (noise traders) were participating in the market 
at time t — 1, but both categories of speculators participate in the market 
at time i, then no imitation occurs and Mt+i =  Mt.
Given such an imitation rule, success breeds imitation. However, 
whatever the extent of the success, the imitation will be constant6.
We also assume that traders are bounded rational in the sense that 
they do not take account of their impact on the number of noise traders of 
the following generation. They act as if the only risk in the economy were 
the fundamental risk and noise traders’ misperception of the dividend 
distributed. Given such an assumption,
6* ^  1 Mt ^  1 Mt ,
Pt =  — +  77— T - r (p t  -  P +  — r P  r (1 +  r) /  r I
_ Z  (7 - 1)7
/  ( 7 - 2 )  r
It follows that for Mt and Mt+\ given
+
Mt
P  (1 +  r )2
ACrn_.t  -
7 - 2 Pt
I  -  l jV a r t (Rt+i) \  I  1 +  r







( Z  (1 +  r)Vart(Rt+\) -  Vart+1(Rt+2) 
\ r l  Vart{Rt+i)
(35)
5See KirmEin (1993)





























































































+ ( / -  2) (7-1)
Mt+1 
I Mxi




( 7 - 2 )  l ^  + f ]  
(7 — l )2 ^Vart{Rt+\) Pt
We are interested in the equilibrium distribution of Mt. Let v be this 
distribution. The complexity of Mt) makes it difficult to com­
pute explicitly this distribution. However, some properties can be dirived. 
Given our imitation rule, | — 1 |<  1. It follows that there exists sets
of parameters such that for all M< G {0, . . . ,  7}, E[AU(Mt- i ,M t)\ > 0. 
The proposition follows.
Proposition 2: Let the pricing rule and the imitation rule be 
respectively given by (33) and (31). If, for all M\ G {0, . . . , 7} and 
M2 G {Mj — 1, M1; Mi +  1}, 7?[A?7n_s(Mi, M2)] > 0 then v is an increasing 
function of M on {2, . . . ,  7 — 1}, v[I) > u(0) and i/(7 — 1) > i/(l).7
The proposition states that in an economy where noise traders have 
a larger expected utility than sophisticated investors have, then on av­
erage more noise traders participate in the economy than sophisticated 
investors do.
Lemma: Let X  be a random variable with a symmetric support 
with respect to 0. If E(X)  > 0 then Prob(X > 0) > 1/2.
Proof: Let /  be the density function of X  and D+ = {x > 0 | 
f (x)  > 0}.
E(X)  =  f  x[f(x) — / ( —x)]dx (36)
Jd+
7 Our result does not depend on the technical assumption in the imitation rule. The 
proposition still holds if we assume that there is always at least one noise trader and 
one sophisticated investor in the economy. The proposition also holds if we assume 
that for any Mt_i 6 {1 ,... ,7 — 1} there is a probability a that a noise trader or a 
sophisticated investor changes of category independently of the difference in utility 





























































































J^+ x[f(x) -  f ( —x)\dx < xdx)  ^ fD+[f(x) “  f (~x)]dx^  (37)
The assumption that X  has a symmetric support with respect to 0, 
E ( X ) > 0 and equation (37) imply that Prob(X > 0) > 1/2. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 2: We consider the following Markov pro­
cess. The state of the economy at time t is represented by Mt~i and M t. 
The transition probability from state (M t-\,M t) to +  1) is given
by P(M t- i ,M t) = Prob(AU„-s[Mt-i,  Mt)] > 0). So given the imitation 
rule chosen, the transion probability from state M t) to — 1)
is [1
Let //(.,.) be the equilibrium distribution of this Markov Chain. Then for 
all M =  1, 1,
v(M) = fi(M, M  -  1) +  n(M, M)  +  n(M, M  +  1) (38)
It should be noted that for all M  G 2 , — 2, p(M. XI) =  0 since those 
states cannot be reached. We also have
«/(0) =  / i (0,0)+/i(0, l)  (39)
and
v(I) = l i ( I , I )+ l t ( I , I - l )  (40)
It is immediate that for all M  G { 2 , — 2}
H(M, M  -  1) =  [1 -  P( M  +  1 ,M )\n(M  +  1, M) (41)
+[l -  P (M  -  l ,M )\n (M  -  \ , M)
and
H(M, M + 1) =  P ( M+ \ , M ) f i ( M+ l , M ) + P ( M—l, M ) / t ( M - l , M )  (42)
Step 1: For all M  G 2 , — 2, fi(M — 1, M) =  fi(M, M — 1).
(i) 0(1,2) =  /i(2,l).





























































































M 0,1) =  &n{ 0,0) +  P{ 1,0)/z(l, 0) (44)
It follows that
K  i ,o) =  /t(o,i) =
a
tMo, o)
[ 1 - P ( 1 , 0 ) ] '
From the imitation rule, /z( 1,1) =  //.(0,1). Furthermore,
^(1,0) =  [1 -  P (l, l)]/i(l, 1) + [1 -  P (2, 1)]ai(2, 1)
and
m(1>2) =  P (l, 1) (̂1> 1) +  P(2, 1)m(2, 1)
Equations (45), (46), (47) imply that






(ii) Now, if we assume that p(j -  1, j )  — — 1), then (41) and
(42) imply that +  1) =  fi(j + l , j )
Thus, for all M  =  2 , . . . ,  I  — 2
n(M  -  1, M) = n{M, M  — 1) (49)
Step 2: For all M  — 2 , . . . ,  I  -  2, v(M) > i/ (M -  1).
Equations (41), (42) and (49) imply that
=  <5 ° )
As E(AU„-S) is always positive by assumption, the lemma above implies 
that for all M  = 2 , . . . ,  1 -2 ,  P ( M , M - 1) > 1/2 and P(M , Af+1) > 1/2. 
Therefore,




























































































(iii) i / ( J - l )  = / i ( 7 - l , / ) + / i ( 7 - 1 , 7 - 1 ) + / * ( / - ! , / - 2 ) .  It
and applying the same argument as in (ii), it follows that v(I  — l) > i'(l). 
Q.E.D.
4 Som e w elfare con sid erations
As noise traders may survive even when the imitation rule is based on util­
ity levels, we would like to know if the existence of noise traders worsen or 
improve the welfare of the economy. For this, we modify the assumptions 
of our model following DSSW (1989).
4.1 T he new  assu m ptions
The number of noise traders is fixed (i.e. Mt = M  for all t) and when 
young , all traders have the same initial wealth normalized to one. Each 
share of stock carries ownership of a single unit of physical capital.
The supply of capital is not completely inelastic anymore. The 
capital is supplied following DSSW (1989) and Pagano (1990). Each pe­
riod capital can be built from and melted into consumption goods by 
risk-neutral entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs can exchange capital for 
a constant one unit of consumption for each unit of capital good. En­
































































































Using equation (38), It follows that
v(M) -  i/(M -  1) =  fi(M, M  + 1) -  n{M -  2, M  -  1) > 0 (52)
Step 3: i/(I) > u(0) and v(I  — 1) > i/( 1).
(i) Proceeding as in step 1, one can show that
» ( I , I ) = P { I ~ l ' I ) fi ( I - l , I )
a
and
r t i - i ,  i )  = 11(1 - 1 , 1 - 1 )
which is equivalent to
i / (I) =
[1
P ( J - 2, J - 1)









P ( 1 , 1 ) P ( 1 , 2 ) . . . P ( J - 2 , J - 1 )
[1 -  P(2,1)][1 -  P(3 ,2)]. . .  [1 -  P( I  - 1 , 1 -  1)]
a
M0,0) (57)
'(0 )  =  1 +
a
[ 1 - P ( 1 , 0 ) ]
Mo,o)(1 -  P ( l ,0 ) ] J  (58)
and for all M  = 1 , . . . , ( / — 1) P(M,  M  + 1) > 1/2, P( l ,  1) > 1/2 and 




























































































period t — 1. Then entrepreneurs set the quantity of risky capital available 
each period at
K t = E t- i (N X t + MYt) (61)
This supply rule ensures that the expected value of the stock price pt in 
the future is always equal to one. Furthermore, we assume that investors 
are excluded from building capital and entrepreneurs are excluded from 
trading in stocks.
This model combines two problems studied separately in Pagano (1989) 
and DSSW (1990), the existence of noise traders and the impact of im­
perfect competition on traders welfare.
Quantities traded are unchanged. Equating total demand with the stock 
supply (61) yields
Pt
, , M ( p t - p ' )
I  (1 +  r)
(62)
Thus Var(pt+i) remains unchanged. Conversely to section 3, here imper­
fect competition does not influence prices. This is a consequence of the 
capital supply rule chosen that makes entrepreneurs ’’adapt” their supply 
of capital to investors’ behaviour.
As imperfect competition reduces quantitites traded by both noise traders 
and sophisticated investors, the equilibrium capital stock is then reduced 
compared to a perfectly competitive market. Since the aggregate level 
of consumption of period t is equal to 7(1 +  r) +  K t(£>t — r), the smaller 
the market size, the smaller the level of consumption per individual, on 
average.
4.2 T he level o f socia l welfare
We explicitly compute the expected utility of both noise trader and so­
phisticated investors in order to find out if some government intervention 
is welcome, and if the answer is yes, which policy should be implemented 
to increase the level of social welfare.
U. =  (l +  r) + 2 ( 7 -  l )2 +
{§‘ - r  +  f ( p ( - p *)}2






























































































Un = (l +  r) +
It follows that





(S' ~ r )2 +  p*(6* -  r) +  (1 -  2 f )p '*  +  ( f  -  l ) 2 a2p
(67)
It follows immediately that expected utilities are increasing when the mar­
ket size increases and when the share of noise traders decreases. There­
fore, some government intervention is welcome. Furthermore, one can 
show that imperfect competition and existence of noise traders do not 
have additive impact on traders’welfare, i.e. the sum of utility levels 
obtained by two sophisticated investors trading in an imperfectly com­
petitive economy with noise traders is lower than the sum of utility levels 
obtained by a sophisticated investor trading in an imperfectly competi­
tive economy in the absence of noise trading and a sophisticated investor 
trading in a perfectly competitive economy with noise traders.
4.3 W hich  kind o f governm ent in terven tion  ?
It is easy to see that any kind of policy including taxes is Pareto inferior to 
open market operations in which the government mimicks sophisticated 
investors. Any tax policy based on capital gain8 in order to reduce noise




























































































traders’ incentive to bet on their misperception would also hurt sophisti­
cated investors and so would reduce the degree of competitiveness. Any 
taxes-subsidies policy in order to increase market liquidity9 would not 
reduce the share of noise traders in the economy.
Conversely open market operations solve the two problems. In the 
limit, the market is perfectly competitive and noise traders’ share in the 
economy converges to zero. Expected utility level reached by sophisti­
cated investors is
E(US) = (1 +  r) +  (68)
and expected utility level reached by noise traders is
(6* -  r )2 +  p*(6* -  r) + p*2 + a j \
-------------------si------------------- i  (69)
E{U„) = ( 1 + r )  +
5 C onclusion
Our article has stressed the importance of the degree of competitiveness 
in the economy when considering market selection processes. Speaking 
about destabilizing speculation, Friedman (1953) argued that
’’Professional investors might on average make money while a 
changing body of amateurs regularly lost large sums”
If we think of our sophisticated investors as professional investors and 
noise traders as amateurs, our article can be used to answer Friedman. 
Amateurs are not expected to make losses but are rather expected to 
have higher returns than professional investors do. Furthermore, the less 
competitive the economy, the higher the difference of both return and 
utility between amateurs and professionals. This result is a consequence 
of amateurs’ market power. By playing non optimal strategies, from a 
professional investor ’s point of view, amateurs hurt professionals more




























































































than they hurt themselves. Therefore, the difference in welfare level is 
increased. It follows directly that in such an economy, amateurs may, on 
average, dominate the market in the long run.
6 A p p en d ix
In the case we present now, for any Mt-\  6 {1, . . . ,  I  — 1} there is a prob­
ability 2a that no imtation based on AU(Mt-i,  Mt) occurs. When this 
happens, there is a probability a half that a noise trader changes him­
self into a sophisticated investor or that a sophisticated investor changes 
himself into a noise trader. Thus, for all Mt- i  6 {1, . . . , /  — 1} and
Prob(Mt+i = Mt + 1) =  Prob(AU(Mt~\, Mt) > 0)(1 -  2a) +  a  (i)
Prob(Mt+1 =  M( — 1) =  Prob(AU(Mt-\,  M t) < 0)(1 — 2a) -l-a
I f  Mt-1 =  0 and Mt =  0 
I f  Mt-1 =  0 and Mt =  1
I f  Mt- i  = 1  and Mt = I  
I f  Mt-i  = I  and Mt = I -  1
Prob(Mt+1 =  0) =  1 — a  
Prob{Mt+\ =  1) =  a  
Prob(Mt+\ =  0) =  a  
Prob{Mt+\ =  1) =  1 — 2a 
Prob(Mt+1 =  2) =  a  
Prob(Mt+i — I) — l — a 
Prob(Mt+i =  /  — 1) =  a 
Prob(Mt+i = I) = a 
Prob(Mt+i = I  — 1) =  1 — 2a 
Prob(Mt+i = I  -  2) =  a
The last four cases tell how shifts at time t+ 1  occur when there is 




























































































Proposition 3: Let the pricing rule and the imitation rule be re­
spectively given by (33) and (i). If, for all Mi £ {0 , . . . , / }  and M2 £ 
{Mi — l, Mi, Mi +  1}, E[AU„-,(Mi, M2)] > 0 then v is an increasing 
function of M on { 2 1 } ,  1'( /)  > !/(0) and v(I  — 1) > i'(l).
Proof: Equations (38), (39) and (40) still hold and for all M  £ 
{2 1 } we have
H{M -  1, M) =  [P(M -  2,M  -  1)(1 -  2a) + a]fi{M -  2, M -  1) (ii)
fi{M -  1,M  -  2) =  [{1 -  P ( M  -  2,M  -  1)}(1 -  2a)\n(M  -  2,M  -  1) (iii)
+afi(M  — 2, M — 1) 
+[{1 -  P(M , M  -  1)}(1 -  2a) +  M  -  1)
We deduce that for all M  £ {2, . . . ,  I  — 1}
f i(M — l , M ) + f i ( M — 1, M —2) =  =  n ( M - 2 , M —l ) + n ( M , M - l )  (iv)
Step 1: For all M € {1 ,. . . ,  -f}, n(M — 1, M)  =  /x(M, M  — 1)
(i) /i(0,l )  =  /x(l,0)
Given the imitation rule,
+[P(M, M  -  1)(1 -  2a) +  a]fi(M,M — 1)
/x(0, 0) =  [{1 -  P(1,0)}(1 -  2a) +  a]/x(l,0)
+  (1 -  a)n(0,0)
(v)
and,
MO, 1) =  £*M0,0) +  [P(1,0)(1 -  2a) +  a]/x(l,0) (vi)
It follows that
K  o, i) =  Mi,o) =
a/i(0,0) (vii)




























































































(ii) fi(l , 2) =  /x(2,l)
Given the imitation rule,
/ i ( l , l ) = ( l - 2or)/i(0,l )  (viü)
/z(l, 0) -  [{1 -  P (2 ,1)}(1 -  2a) +  a\n%  1) (ix)
+[{1 -  P{ 1 ,1)}(1 -  2a) +  a]/i(l, 1) +  a/i(0, 1)
Ai(l,2) =  [ P(2 , l ) ( l - 2a ) +a ] / * ( 2 , l )  (x)
+[P(1,1)(1 -  2a) +  a]/i( 1, 1) +  a/i(0, 1)
Equations (viii) and (ix) imply
H(2,1) =  Ain(0,1) (xi)
where
2a ( l  — a) +  (1 — 2a)2P ( l, 1)
1 {1 — P(2,1)}(1 — 2a) +  a  1 '
(ix) and (x) imply
/*(1, 0) +  a*(1, 2) =  2a/i(0,l )  + M M )  +M 2, 1) (xiii)
Putting (viii), (xi) and (xii) into (xiii), we deduce that fi(l,2) = 0)
and so /x( 1, 2) =  n(2, 1).
(iii) For all M  € {1, . . . ,  7 -  2}, /i(M, M  +  1) =  /z(M +  1, M)
Given that ^(1,2) =  /i(2,l) and using equation (iv), the result is imme­
diate.
(iv) n(I -  1,7) =  n(I,I -  1)
We proceed as in (ii).
p(I —  1 ,/  —  1) =  (1 —  2a)fj,(I,I — 1) (xiv)
/i(7 -  1,/) =  [P(7 - 2, 1 -  1)(1 -  2a) +  a]/x(7 - 2,1 - 1) (xv)
+afi(I,I -  1)




























































































n(I  -  1, /  -  2) =  [{1 -  P{I - 2 , 1 -  1)}(1 -  2a) + a]fi(I - 2 , 1 -  l)(xvi)
+ a n (I ,I  -  1)
+[{1 1)}(1 -  2a) + a]fi(I - 1 , 1 - 1 )
(xv) and (xvi) imply that (1 -  2a)n(I -  1,1) = fi(I -  1,1 -  1), thus
H{I,I - 1 )  = fi(I - 1 , 1 ) .  (xvii)
Step 2: For all M  6 { 2 , 1 }
n (M ,M  — 1)
P (M  — 1, M  -  2)(1 - 2 a )  + a 
[ 1 - P { M , M - 1 ) ] { 1 - 2 a )  + a
fi(M — 1 ,M  — 2) (xviii)
Using equations (ii) and (iii) and stepl, the result is immediate.
Step 3: For all M  G {2, . . . ,  I  — 2}, v(M  +  1) > v(M).  
Using step 2 and lemma 1, the result is immediate.
Step 4: v(I) > ^(0) and v(I  — 1) > j/(1)
Equations (xv), (xvi) and (xvii) imply that n ( I —l , I )  = A-in{I — 2.1 — 1) 
where
P ( J - l , / - 2 ) ( l - 2 a ) + o  
2a(l -  a) +  (1 -  2a)2[l -  P{I -  1,1 -  1)] (xix)
The imitation rule imply that afi(I,I) = [q- +  P(I  — l . / ) ( l  — 
2a)\n(I -  1,1)
Given that for all Mi G { 2 , . . . , / -  1} and M2 G {Mi -  1, M x. M x +  1}. 
P(M i ,M2) > 1/ 2, it follows that A2Y < A\. Proceeding as in the proof 
of proposition 2, we have the desired result. Q.E.D.
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